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ALALIA AND THE AFTERMATH
Abstract: The battle at Alalia mentioned by Herodotos has long been at 
the centre of debate with regards to a potential ‘Carthaginian Blockade’ 
of the Straits of Gibraltar, perhaps preventing the Phokaian Greeks from 
entering the Atlantic and its coastal markets. There are further ancient 
sources which directly or indirectly give clues to Alalia, its circumstances and 
its aftermath. The battle may have had an impact on the Phokaian Greeks’ 
freedom of movement in that they chose not to attempt to sail through the 
Straits of Gibraltar, all the more as the northern markets could be reached 
via inland routes along the streams that, albeit with some expensive overland 
transport in between, connected the Mediterranean with the Atlantic. Their 
concentration around the mouth of the Rhône facilitated the Greek trade in 
e.g. tin from the north, without the need to engage the Carthaginians, if the 
latter indeed controlled maritime traffic to and from the Mediterranean at the 
Straits. Although they may have retreated from Alalia, and the Carthaginians, 
as before, controlled the seas west of Empùries, the Phokaian Greeks did not 
withdraw from the Tyrrhenian Sea or the western Mediterranean altogether, 
but remained influential and prosperous in the area, even if Massalia 
experienced a period of economic decline. As such, the result of the battle at 
Alalia, regardless of whether it was a Greek victory or defeat, had little impact 
on the balance of power in the western Mediterranean around the middle of 
the first millennium BCE.
Keywords: Alalia; Herodotos; Phokaian Greeks; Carthaginian Blockade; Ancient 
Maritime Trade
Similar to Alésia, Alalia (modern day Aléria on Corsica) was foremost an ancient settlement. Better known than the names of these two places are however the battles that were fought at them and with which they 
were associated – both became known as important events in history. At 
Alesia Vercingetorix was subdued by Julius Caesar1, while at Alalia, though 
the Greek colonists from Phokaia achieved a Cadmeian victory, they lost two-
thirds of their fleet and retreated to Southern Italy2; some opine that Carthage 
may have seized the moment to bar the Strait of Gibraltar for Greek maritime 
traffic3, as well as prevent any further attempts at Greek colonisation of the 
Western Mediterranean4.
THE BATTLE OF ALALIA IN THE SOURCES
The key primary source for the Battle at Alalia is Herodotos, who 
described that the settlement had been founded, perhaps based on a 
misunderstanding, around 565 BCE5. Twenty years later the Persian General 
1  CAESAR, De Bello Gallico, VII, 89.
2  HERODOTOS I, 165-7.
3  HENNIG 1944, 134, 161; CARPENTER 1966, 51; ALONSO-NÚNEZ 1987, 244-45; CASSON 
1991, 75; CUNLIFFE 2001b, 56; ROLLER 2006, 14.
4  SHIPLEY 2011, 89, 197.
5  Cf. HERODOTOS I, 165, 167.
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Harpagos laid siege to the city of Phokaia, upon which a 
majority of the population fled to Alalia. After these new-
arrivals had lived alongside the former colonists for around 
five years (causing considerable annoyance with their 
neighbours on the eastern coast of Corsica), the Carthaginians 
and Etruscans attacked, each with a force of sixty ships. 
Although the Phokaians came out of the battle victorious, 
they fled yet again, initially to Rhegion (Reggio Calabria) and 
subsequently to Oinotria in lower Italy, where they founded 
a new settlement which they named Hyële, later known as 
Elea, and Velia in the Roman Period. As for the reasons why a 
flight from Alalia was necessary after the colony had already 
been in existence for over twenty years, or as to why the 
Phokaians chose to retreat to Rhegion and then Elea, rather 
than to settle further northwest where there were already 
some other Phokaian, or at least Greek, settlements along 
the coast, Herodotos is silent. Among the causes could be 
that there were no further Greek settlements on Corsica6 
and Alalia was therefore deep in hostile territory – why they 
moved southeast rather than northwest is however unclear. 
It is also possible however (despite a considerable tendency 
of disbelief towards the notion) that the realisation that they 
had misunderstood the oracle a quarter of a century earlier7 
was sufficient to convince the last doubters that settling 
on Corsica had been a bad idea from the start. Yet another 
possibility is that the story about the reinterpretation of the 
oracle was in itself a means to plausibly argue for the sudden 
abandonment of Alalia to attentive listeners like Herodotos, 
while at the same time holding on to the claim of unlikely 
victory8. 
Thukydides9 too, namely, speaks only of a Phokaian 
victory in a battle at sea against the Carthaginians. Although 
he merely reports that the battle took place around the 
time of the founding of Massalia, and mentions nothing 
of misunderstood oracles, Etruscans or Alalia and Elea, in 
a passage of text in which he speaks of great (Greek) naval 
powers of the past (i.e. before the Athenians and over a 
century before his own time), it is possible that Thukydides 
does indeed mean the famous battle at Alalia – if it should not 
suddenly turn out that Carthage had already unsuccessfully 
attempted to disrupt the Greek colonisation of Southern 
Gaul, decades before Alalia. 
Another short, indirect reference is also to be found 
in Strabo who cites Antiochos of Syracuse10, who, in turn, 
does also not mention Alalia, though he does state that 
the Phokaians founded Elea after Harpagos’ capture of the 
home-city of Phokaia, but only after having sailed first to 
Corsica and Massalia, whence they were however driven 
away11. As the extract in Strabo primarily serves the purpose 
6  SHIPLEY 2011, 94.
7  HERODOTOS I, 165-7.
8  See GRAS 1972, 698 who, whoever the victors, sees at least positive effects 
for the Phokaians, but also SACHS 2014, 133 who pleads much more for a 
Greek defeat at Alalia.
9  I, 13 – and see HERMARY/HESNARD/TRÉZINY 1999, 40 regarding 
interpretation of this text-passage.
10  Geographica VI, 1, 1.
11  Depending on the translation consulted, they were „driven thence“ 
(HAMILTON 1854), „zurückgewiesen“ (FORBIGER 1858), „beaten off “ 
(JONES 1932) or „driven away“ (ROLLER 2014), whereby it is not ultimately 
clear (except in Jones) whether this means only from Corsica or also from 
Massalia.
of being a description of the south Italian Coast, the lack of 
a mention of the Battle at Alalia is not necessarily relevant. 
Strabo nevertheless says comparatively little about Corsica, 
which shares two chapters in book five of his Geographica 
with Sardinia12, amongst other things however that one can 
see the islands of Elba, Corsica and Sardinia from the hilltop 
at Poplonion, and that Corsican slaves were purportedly of 
particularly low quality.
Michel Gras13 lists further primary sources with 
potential relevance, on the one hand Pompey Trogus, 
handed down by Justin, on the other Pausanias. According 
to the epitome in Justin14, Pompey Trogus mentions a naval 
battle, maybe near Sardinia, in which the Carthaginians lost 
most of their troops, after having long been successful in 
Sicily. In Pompey Trogus’ second extract in Justin there is 
talk of a war that broke out because of the theft of a couple 
of fishing boats, as well as a negotiated peace between the 
Massaliots and the Carthaginians15. Gras believes that both 
text-passages in Justin could relate to the Battle of Alalia, 
despite there being solely mention of Sardinia rather than 
Corsica; he argues that Justin’s summary contains a collage 
of (incomplete) data and that the naming of Sardinia refers 
rather to the Sardinian Sea, thus the starting point from 
which the Carthaginians disembarked into the battle – hence 
that the Carthaginians departed from one of their Sardinian 
harbours and crossed the sea over to Corsica to engage in 
naval warfare with the Greeks (or indeed Massaliots) there16. 
This is interesting, although it is in contradiction with 
Herodotos who does not mention Massalia in connection 
with Alalia, and it is moreover hard to fathom that such a 
maritime power as Carthage was, it would be able to suffer 
the demise of the majority of its ships, or rather that its 
navy consisted of a mere sixty vessels, even more so as the 
Etruscans too, could themselves contribute sixty ships to the 
battle – though perhaps this text-passage should be taken 
with the same caution and viewed in context of the collage of 
fragmentary information as proposed by Gras. 
Supplementary to the above is the information 
gleaned from Pausanias17 who, in his description of Delphi 
mentions two votive statues (one of Athena Pronoia, the 
other a bronze Apollo) donated by the Massaliots following 
a victory celebrated against the Carthaginians. Pausanias 
does not state whether both commemorative gifts were 
commissioned for a victory at the same battle, however 
does note that Massalia was a Phokaian colony which was 
founded by refugees when their home-city of Phokaia had 
been attacked by the Persians – and that by defeating the 
Carthaginians in a (or more than one) naval battle they 
were able to consolidate their territory in the Golfe du Lion. 
Considering the Phokaian retreat as described in Herodotos, 
the assumption appears likely that Pausanias’ source was 
Thukydides18, or, that the Phokaians and Carthaginians had 
clashed already before Alalia, around the founding date of 
Massalia, and the Phokaians (or rather Massaliots) came out 
12  Geographica, V, 2, 7-8.
13  GRAS 1987, 162ff.
14  XVIII, 7, 1.
15  XLIII, 5, 2.
16  GRAS 1987, 164.
17  Hellados Periegesis X, 8, 6, X, 18, 7.
18  I, 13.
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of the battle victorious at this earlier point in time as well. An 
alternative interpretation of Pausanias X, 8, 6, namely that 
the foundation date of Marseilles is to be placed later in the 
sixth century BCE, i.e. around the time of the battle at Alalia 
or Harpagos’ siege of Phokaia respectively, can be ruled out 
with considerable certainty thanks to the archaeological 
material unearthed at Marseilles dated at least back to the 
beginning of the sixth century BCE19.
THE AFTERMATH: THEORIES, THE TIN TRADE 
AND OTHER FACTORS
The Battle of Alalia and the Phokaian-Greek retreat 
may have meant the definitive cessation of Greek business 
relations with Tartessos, even if, or despite the fact 
Arganthonios was already dead before that time – Herodotos’ 
words on the topic allow space for interpretation. What can 
be said against it is however that Alalia by no means meant 
the end of the Greeks in the western Mediterranean, as 
e.g. Massalia and the other Greek towns and settlements 
along the coast of Southern Gaul continued to flourish. It 
is however possible that the Massaliots, with Cadiz in close 
vicinity to Tartessos, and the Phoenician-Carthaginian 
hegemony in the south-western Mediterranean, did not 
venture further south or west than their20 colony Emporion21 
and instead concentrated on the business opportunities 
further north along the river banks, or on monitoring and 
control of the traffic north- and southwards of those same 
inland trade routes. 
On the other hand, once again with referral to a 
much-cited passage within book three of Herodotos: […] it 
cannot be disputed that tin and amber do come to us from what 
one might call the edges of the earth22. Although Herodotos 
claims that he knows nothing of the existence of Tin Islands 
or of a sea in the northwest, it does seem out of the question 
for him that the Greeks, at the time of his writing at least, 
obtained their tin (and their amber) from anywhere else 
than that faraway place. Therefore, around a century after 
Alalia and a century before Pytheas an established tin-route 
must have been in existence from northern Europe all the 
way to Greece – for Herodotos this appears to have been fact 
and common sense. 
Considering the matter that there were other sources 
of tin available in the Mediterranean, among which Galicia 
and Elba, perhaps Sardinia23, and maybe even Tartessos24, it 
begs the question as to why it was so crystal-clear to Herodotos 
that the tin that arrived to Greece in the fifth century BCE did 
not come from a Mediterranean, but from a (north?)western 
19  GRAHAM 1982, 140.
20  PSEUDO-SKYLAX’ Periplous, 4 – but see SACHS 2014, 102-4, 
DOMINGUEZ-MONEDERO 2013, 24 and LIVY XXVI, 19, XXXIV, 9 for 
colonisation directly from Phokaia rather than via Massalia.
21  AUBET/TURTON 2005, 193: „modern criticism has shown that no Greek 
colonies existed south of Emporion“.
22  III, 115; translated by de A. Sélincourt 1954. Various translations are in 
pretty close agreement with regards to Herodotos’ convictions: „Freilich 
kommt dass Zinn […]“ (Lange 1885), “[T]in and amber certainly come to 
us […]” (Macaulay 1890), “All we know is that our tin […]” (Godley 1920).
23  PENHALLURICK 1986, 79-80, 95, and Reusser, pers. comm. SE Provincia, 
Zürich 26.05.2016
24  See current discussion regarding Tarshish and its (im)possible 
identification with Tartessos in Ezekiel 27, 12, 1st Book of Kings 10.21-22 and 
2nd Book of Chronicles 9.20-21 in AUBET 2001, 45, but also KOCH 2010 
188,198-99; KOCH 2013, 126.
European source instead. Given the detailed stories he tells 
about Arganthonios as well as Kolaios of Samos’ fairytale 
silver haul25, it should be clear that Herodotos cannot have 
meant Tartessos, which (in his view) after all, was silver-
territory. Were the Mediterranean or Iberian sources of tin 
out of reach for the Greeks a) because they did not exist or 
not at that particular point in time or b) because they were 
dominated by other powers in the area; the hypothetical 
sources on Elba and Sardinia by the Etruscans, and the 
Galician mines by Cadiz and the Phoenicians/Carthaginians, 
if a Greek vessel would at all have been able to succeed in 
passing through the Pillars of Herakles in the first place? In 
the case of an available and exploitable tin resource on the 
islands within the Tyrrhenian Sea, one must naturally take 
the more or less attested Greek-Etruscan trade relations26 
into consideration. In the Mediterranean however, tin was 
a rather rare commodity27 and one may speculate about the 
probability of the Etruscans’ willingness to trade tin with 
the Greeks, of all people, if indeed the Etruscans were in 
possession of tin, capable of acquiring it from the mines and 
if their deposits on the islands in the Tyrrhenian Sea were 
at all able to satisfy the Greek demand. The same can be said 
of the Phoenicians/Carthaginians and their resources in 
Galicia or further away – though a slight difference could be, 
again keeping Herodotos’ words in mind, that both tin and 
amber may have found their way to Greece from the distant 
northwest passing through Phoenician and Carthaginian 
hands, if it did not or not exclusively travel along land and 
river routes28 via Massalia to the Greeks of Herodotos’ day. 
The rather peculiar fact that Herodotos merely mentions 
Massalia ‘in passing’29, without elaborating at all about the 
geostrategic relevance or general importance of the colony, 
although he does elsewhere acknowledge the historical 
significance of Phokaia and the Phokaians30, is also quite 
interesting. Nevertheless, we can reach some first, interim 
conclusions from the historical sources and modern theories:
1. Tin came to Greece (according to Herodotos) from the 
far (north)west (which was unknown to him).
2. As Herodotos knew Tartessos and thus a large part of 
southwestern Iberia quite well and was able to describe 
it in some detail, although he appears to have never 
actually been there31, the (north)western tin specified by 
Herodotos probably neither originated from Tartessos 
nor from Iberia.
3. Because the Phoenicians/Carthaginians had access to 
the Galician (and if existent potentially Tartessian) 
tin, the Greeks however received their tin from further 
away, it is less likely that the Phoenicians/Carthaginians 
were the suppliers of the Greeks. 
4. After their victory (tantamount to a defeat) at Alalia, 
the Phokaians retreated partly to Hyële/Elea/Velia in 
the east, presumably partly to Massalia and possibly 
other Emporiae or Greek settlements around the Golfe 
du Lion and environs.
25  I, 163, IV, 152.
26  See e.g. LONG/MIRO/VOLPE 1992, 229-230.
27  PENHALLURICK 1986, 79.
28  Inter alia HENNIG 1944, 162, RIVET 1988, 131; BOTERMANN 2005, 69.
29  V, 9.
30  I, 163-168, VI, 11-17.
31  See ALONSO-NÚNEZ 1987, 247-48, also concerning HERODOTOS IV, 192.
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If we consult later sources specific to the ancient tin 
trade (and assume that the methods described are applicable 
some centuries retroactively), point 3 above becomes 
somewhat clearer. Once again Strabo delivers the famous 
anecdote about the Phoenician captain who ran his ship 
aground so as to not reveal the location of the tin islands 
to the Romans32; in the same passage he narrates about the 
appearance and life of the inhabitants of the tin isles, their 
merchandise, the geographic location of the tin islands, that 
is to say not in Britain but north of Galicia and the Iberian 
Peninsula, and finally reveals a valuable detail, namely that 
only the Phoenicians were able to exploit the markets of 
the tin islands, which they did from Cadiz as hub – which 
makes sense if the Kassiterides are supposed to have lain 
in close vicinity to Iberia. In this case it would make perfect 
sense to consider the tin isles as a Galician, rather than a 
British source of the metal. Pomponius Mela too sees the 
Kassiterides before (Celt)Iberia33.
Diodorus Siculus initially confirms this point of view; 
he treats the tin islands, and Britain, as a source of tin, in 
two distinctive, separate sections34 – in his description 
of the Kassiterides in 5.38.4 of his Bibliotheca Historica, a 
small cross-reference to Britain has however found its way 
into the narrative, as he recounts that from there, too, tin 
is transported thence (although Diodorus had in the prior, 
separate passage in 5.22.2 already mentioned transportation 
of tin onto the British island of Ictis35), via the land route and 
on horseback through Gaul to Massalia and Narbo. Notable 
things to point out in this respect however would on the one 
hand be the fact that both Strabo and Diodorus wrote some 
time after the fall of Carthage, and on the other, that much 
less produce can be transported on horseback than cargo 
inside the belly of a ship, even if river going ships are much 
narrower than ships designed for open sea36. Nevertheless, 
if we should be so bold to completely reject the formerly 
widely (though not universally) recognised, but meanwhile 
rather doubtable37 theory that the Kassiterides should have 
been Britannic islands, and rely instead on the later sources 
who place them further south near Iberia (even if there is no 
amber available there), one could be inclined to believe that 
it was indeed the Phoenicians, or Carthaginians respectively, 
who controlled the tin deposits and trade in (and on the 
islands close to) Iberia, while the Greeks, because the Straits 
of Gibraltar were closed to them, were forced to rely on 
sources further afield in Britannia and on the transportation 
of the metal via land and river routes across Gaul through to 
Massalia. 
A little caveat to the above assertion appears in 
the Elder Pliny (as well as, again, Herodotos38) who wrote: 
plumbum album ex Cassiteride insula primus adportavit 
Midacritus39. Roller considers the name Midacritus to be 
32  III, 5, 11.
33  De Chorographia, III, 47.
34  5.22.1-2 for Britannia, 5.38.4 for the Kassiterides which he sees in Iberia, 
north of Lusitania.
35  Cf. also the Elder PLINY IV, 41.
36  Jézégou, pers. comm. excursion Port-La-Nautique 13.05.2016.
37  Cf. e.g. CARPENTER 1966, 202; Henderson (ed.) 1989, 638 (commentary 
in Loeb’s PLINY, VII, 197), with PENHALLURICK 1980, 121, and see also 
ROLLER 2006, 1.
38  As above (nr 22), III, 115.
39  Historia Naturalis VII, 197; (loosely translated) Tin (‚white lead‘?) from 
Greek, specifically Ionian, namely Midakritos40, which, if 
Pliny can be so interpreted, would be in direct contradiction 
with Strabo and would confirm Herodotos’ claim in that 
the Kassiterides were a source (if indeed there were not 
more than one known as such41) of tin exploited by Greeks 
– insofar Midakritos did not purchase the tin from (Punic) 
middlemen, which however within the context of his mention 
within Pliny would seem rather unlikely42, or if Midakritos’ 
expedition took place long before the battle at Alalia and a 
potential blockade of the Straits of Gibraltar around 540 
BCE; or, in turn, because Midakritos finally, is, after all, not 
a historical, but rather an as yet unknown, mythical figure, 
similar perhaps to Daedalus, Cadmos the founder of Thebes, 
the (Homerian) Cyclope, Toxius Son of Uranus or Sol Son of 
Okeanos, who too are all listed by Pliny in his catalogue of 
extraordinary accomplishments in Historia Naturalis, VII, 
191-215? The fact that Pliny mentions the name Midacritus 
almost in passing could be a potential indicator for this – 
while he identifies others with titles such as ‘son of…’ or ‘…
the Phoenician’ much more specifically – as if there would be 
no doubt whatsoever among his readers about who exactly 
this Midakritos or Midacritus actually was. On the other 
hand Pliny is the single remaining historical source who 
mentions him.
A further event finally, without direct Greek 
participation, which may have had an impact on the hegemony 
of the Carthaginians in the western Mediterranean and 
accessibility of the Atlantic outside the Straits, was the first 
Roman-Carthaginian treaty, discussed by Polybios43, dated 
to approx. 508-07 BCE, 28 years before Xerxes’ conquest of 
Greece44. The treaty e.g. records how far west the Romans were 
entitled to sail, namely not further than a cape to the north 
of Carthage, which meant virtually the whole of the western 
Mediterranean, save the Tyhrrenian Sea. Polybios moreover 
notes that the Carthaginians considered Lybia and Sardinia 
their property, Sicily partly, and the Romans were allowed to 
(under supervision) trade in the Carthaginian territories in 
Lybia, Sardinia and Sicily45, like everybody else. The west was 
also restricted to Rome’s allies, while Corsica, which is not 
mentioned in the treaty at all, was presumably considered 
to be Etruscan territory by both sides thirty years after 
the Kassiterides was first brought by Midacritus.
40  ROLLER 2006, 12, but cf. Müllenhoff, cited by HENNIG 1944, 56 for an 
alternative and perhaps somewhat unorthodox theory concerning a deviation 
of the name Midacritus from Melikartes/Melqart – presupposing that Pliny 
(or his source) did not know Melqart; and according to BOSCH-GIMPERA 
1944, 53-54; HERMARY, HESNARD/TRÉZINY 1999, 91 finally he could 
have originated from Massalia itself.
41  Cf. PSEUDO-SKYLAX’ Periplous, 21 and commentary in SHIPLEY 2011, 
106 for a reference to so-called  Elektrides, hence ‚amber-islands‘, in the 
Mediterranean, nearby Illyria – obviously not the primary source of amber, 
rather a stopover, center of trade or a market, possible therefore that there 
were several of them.
42  Historia Naturalis, VII, 191-215 is a catalogue of extraordinary 
achievements, inventions or actions and the names, some mythical, of those 
first responsible for them (according to Pliny or his sources, respectively); e.g. 
the Spartans invented slavery (VII, 200), Minos was the first to be victorious 
in a naval battle with a fleet (VII, 209), and Prometheus the first to slaughter 
an ox (VII, 210); Midakritos hence would not have appeared in Pliny’s list if 
his accomplishment had not been remarkable in one way or another. See also 
ROLLER 2006, 13.
43  Historiai, III, 22-23.
44  Historiai, III, 22.
45  Historiai, III, 23.
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Alalia anyway. Although the position of the Massaliotes and 
the western Greeks is also lacking from the treaty, it should 
be quite evident that the vehemence with which Carthage 
laid claim to its perceived territorial possessions vis-à-vis 
the Romans, was equally valid for any other Mediterranean 
party. If the Etruscans, who had, even if only in temporary 
alliance with Carthage expelled the Phokaians from Corsica 
merely thirty years earlier, were still in loose confederation 
with the Carthaginians, all who remained of the maritime 
powers at the time were the western Greeks, who may well 
have been recognised in their Sicilian regions and the area 
around the Golfe du Lion – but thus should kindly stay out of 
the western Punic affairs. Cook’s views here are interesting, 
who wrote that the seas west of the Strait of Messina, after 
the mass flight of refugees after the fall of Phokaia “seem 
to have been infested by Phocaeans for five years until their 
losses […] off Alalia put a check to their aggressiveness.”46. 
Absolutely conceivable is too, that even if, as Herodotos 
describes, somewhat less than half of the total population of 
Phokaia (who moreover had initially attempted to convince 
the Chians to sell them one of the islands in Chios’ territory 
– the Chians however rejected the offer as they feared the 
Phokaians would take over trading activity in the region and 
force Chios out of the market47) fled westward, these many 
people at once needed to be fed in a short period of time, 
and by what better method than the Phokaians doing what 
they do best, playing out one of their chief skills at sea (i.e. 
piracy)48? The obvious side-effect of this however was that 
they therein caused considerable irritation to the Punic-
Etruscan sphere of influence and trade, and the Phokaians 
therefore needed to be put back into their place by a punitive 
expedition which restored the status quo before the arrival of 
the masses at Alalia49. It is quite feasible that the Phokaians 
retreated not only to Elea, but also to Massalia, or rather 
that Massalia, as suggested by Pompey Trogus in Justin50 
and by Pausanias51, was involved in the issue from the 
start, but either unwilling or unable52 to accommodate the 
entire body of Phokaian refugees, and these were therefore 
partly referred to the recently established colony at Alalia. 
After the renewed exodus from Alalia, they were then 
redistributed onto Rhegium, Elea, Massalia and perhaps 
other Phokaian-Greek settlements and foundations on the 
shores of southern Gaul, Italy and north-eastern Iberia53. Of 
these, initially, particularly Massalia prospered – because of 
the alternative merchant-route up the Rhône into the north? 
THE ARCHAEOLOGY AND CONCLUSIONS
The theory as to whether the Greeks of the western 
Mediterranean were barred from passing the Straits of 
Gibraltar is based to a certain degree on the hypothetical 
economic decline to which the excavations and distribution 
46  COOK 1982, 214.
47  HERODOTOS I, 165.
48  See GRAS 1972, 703 or also HERODOTOS VI, 17.
49  SACHS 2014, 133.
50  XLIII, 5, 2.
51  Hellados Periegesis X, 8, 6, X, 18, 7.
52  BOSCH-GIMPERA 1944, 54-55; GRAHAM 1982, 140 point out that 
similar to Phokaia itself, the Phokaian colonies in the west possessed little in 
surrounding local territory (chora) and were therefore all the more dependent 
on the sea; see also maps in HERMARY/HESNARD/TRÉZINY 1999, 26.
53  See also MIERSE 1994, 791; DOMINGUEZ-MONEDERO 2013, 2.
ceramics point, which indicate a potential decrease in trading 
activity in Massalia at the start of the fifth century BCE on 
the one hand, and a reduction of Massaliote products, as well 
as Greek (mostly Attic) luxury pottery imports arriving at 
the Hallstatt-Oppida west of the Rhône on the other54. In 
Massalia itself the number of Attic fine tableware reduces 
dramatically around 500 BCE, while it had been imported 
in very large numbers a mere fifty years earlier – evidently 
the Oppida of southern Gaul (e.g. Substantion, Bessan, Pech-
Maho, Béziers, Montlaurés and particularly Ensérune) had 
been furnished with Attic pottery provided by Massalia55. 
Already shortly after the fall of Phokaia moreover, the 
supply of eastern Greek ceramics effectively appears to grind 
to a complete halt56. At the same time however, the number 
of Attic imports greatly increase further west in Emporion 
(modern Ampurias, or Catalonian, Empùries)57.
While Massalia thus may have experienced a period 
of economic downturn during the fifth century BCE and 
trading activity with the Gallic chiefdoms in the surrounding 
territories similarly declined quite noticeably, the same could 
not be said for Greek wares in the western Mediterranean in 
general, insofar one can assume that these were distributed 
by western Greek sailors and tradesmen, at least to a large 
extent. Although the amount of Ionic imports runs dry 
almost completely shortly after the Persian siege of Phokaia, 
Attic imports remain at an almost unchanged high until 
into the middle of the fourth century BCE58. The peak was 
reached between 430 and 370 in Malaga, and Athenian wares 
scattered deep into the Iberian hinterland, as far as Huelva, 
outside the Mediterranean. The impetus for this flourishing 
trade appears to have been Emporion, this in great 
contrast to Massalia59, even despite the fact that during the 
foundation period of Emporion most merchandise actually 
originated from Massalia. Considering the massive increase 
in Attic wares, presumably directly from Athens (or at best 
via Sicily) rather than through Massalia, it is conceivable 
that Emporion itself became a major trading hub60, stepping 
outside of the initial shadow of Massalia. Somewhat later 
at the start of the fourth century BCE moreover, Athenian 
motives begin to appear on the coinage from Emporion, 
which may indicate direct trading contacts61.
Rumours of Phokaian or Massaliote colonies such 
as Maenace (or Hemeroscopeion) further southwest, which 
have kept scholarship busy until late into the last century62 
mostly because of mention thereof within Avienus63, Pseudo-
Skymnos64 and Strabo65, have as yet not yet been able to 
be archaeologically substantiated, may have arisen due to 
oral ‘Hellenisations’ (‘Greek-sounding’ pronunciations) of 
54  GRAHAM 1982, 141; HERMARY/HESNARD/TRÉZINY 1999, 91.
55  VILLARD 1960, 119-21.
56  SCHMITT 1963, 284.
57  VILLARD 1960, 114-19.
58  LOWE 2009, 40; DOMINGUEZ-MONEDERO, 2006, 466-467.
59  LOWE 2009, 40.
60  MIERSE 1994, 795; SACHS 2014, 129.
61  SACHS, 2014, 128-129.
62  See e.g. SCHULTEN 1936, 295ff., contradicting views in GRAHAM 
1982, 139; COOK 1982, 214 in the same volume; VILLARD 1960, 118-119 
(Héméroscopeion), as well as MURPHY 1977, 62; LOMBARDO 2002, 76
63  Ora Maritima 427-430.
64  Periegesis ad Nicomedem regem, 147.
65  III, 4, 2.
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other, perhaps Phoenician toponyms66, and meanwhile the 
consensus does not point to the existence (at least verifiable) 
of Greek settlements further west of Emporion67. 
In the end, it begs the question, in the case of 
a (impossibly provable) Carthaginian blockade of the 
Heraklean Pillars, what may have been the main drive 
of the Greeks to pass the Straits of Gibraltar at all – 
specifically factoring out Pytheas’ expedition, the exact 
nature (perhaps scientific – though Ellmers argues that 
Pytheas was a merchant68) and itinerary of which are as 
yet still not securely known anyway69 – if we consider that 
a corridor to the north, albeit a long and strenuous (and 
expensive70) voyage across land and along river routes, was 
already available. Even more so, as along the Atlantic route 
lay powerful Cadiz, where Greeks were quite possibly not the 
most welcome travellers, certainly after Alalia. Apart from 
the lower cost of transport compared to overland, the chief 
stimulus for voyages outside of the Pillars, at least before 
Alalia, seems to have been the commercial exchange with 
Tartessos, whose king Arganthonios (note the resemblance 
of the royal name with the main commodity brought back 
thence by Kolaios of Samos71) entertained excellent relations 
with the Phokaians72. At the time of the foundation of Alalia 
this very Arganthonios was already dead73 and a half century 
later Tartessos had potentially already been destroyed or 
annexed by Carthage74. Nevertheless, Greek produce was 
still being received in former Tartessian territory, though 
it was not (longer) necessary to circumnavigate the Iberian 
Peninsula for it to arrive there. Around the end of the fifth 
century BCE it can be observed that trade and distribution 
of Greek, particularly Attic wares between Emporion 
to Huelva and Cadiz re-intensifies, for which foremost 
however Iberian elites and new overland routes across the 
Iberian Peninsula appear to be responsible75. With potential 
trading networks  along the inner-European streams (Aude/
Garonne, Rhône [Saône, Seine], Loire76, Rhine) towards the 
north as well as to the west on the Iberian Peninsula, there 
was no longer a necessity (though, again, only if we factor 
out the cost of overland travel77) to take on the burden of 
the perilous journey through the Pillars of Herakles78, even 
66  NIEMEYER/WARNING TREUMANN 1980, 185-89; AUBET/TURTON 
2005, 196.
67  See however recently ROLLER 2015, 37, 222 regarding Hemeroskopeion.
68  ELLMERS 2010, 373.
69  Horst ROSEMAN 1994, 3ff., CUNLIFFE 2001b, 56-58, and see BOSCH-
GIMPERA 1944, 58 for the theory of „occasional blockade-running“.
70  ELLMERS 2010, 368, 370.
71  Herodotos IV, 152.
72  Herodotos I, 163.
73  Herodotos I, 165.
74  SCHULTEN, 1936, 304; BOSCH-GIMPERA 1944, 56; and see Avienus 
85, 270, Pliny IV, 120 and even Cicero De Senectute 69, as well as AUBET 
2001, 206 and GONZALEZ DE CANALES CERISOLA, 2014, 568 for later 
confusion of the ancient sources between Tartessos and Cadiz/Gadir.
75  DOMINGUEZ-MONEDERO 2006, 467-472.
76  See Strabo IV, 2, 1, CUNLIFFE 2001a, 335; HORST ROSEMAN 1994, 66; 
and especially ROLLER 2015, 33, 38 for a very bold theory or interpretation 
regarding colonisation of Massaliote merchants in an existing Gallic trading 
port named Korbilon (Nantes?) at the mouth of the Loire. Nevertheless 
(Strabo calls Korbilon a ἐμπόριος), the extract may point to concrete, direct 
Massaliote contacts with dwellers on the Atlantic coast (and perhaps even a 
presence of these in Massalia itself), at least since the 2nd century BCE.
77  ELLMERS 2010, 368, 370.
78  See e.g. AVIENUS 117-129, 380-389, 406-415.
if the Phokaians had explored the Atlantic coast to a certain 
distance (Ophioussa?) already in the past79; the geographical 
knowledge of the Atlantic coast beyond the Iberian Peninsula 
past Cadiz appears, at least by the Greeks (or rather Greek 
armchair geographers and the like, whose writings have been 
passed down to us) and until the advent of Roman conquest, 
to have vanished from memory80. 
The possible consequences of the battle at Alalia can 
thus be summarised as follows:
1. In the aftermath of the perceived Carthaginian victory 
at Alalia on Corsica, the Greeks withdrew to Rhegion, 
Elea, Massalia, Emporion and presumably other 
(Phokaian) settlements in the western Mediterranean 
and for the time being concentrated their efforts on the 
trade with the tribes of southern Gaul, later with local 
Iberian populations.
2. The Carthaginians (as before and after the fall of 
Tartessos) most probably kept the Mediterranean to 
the southwest of Emporion under their control.
Whether, as has been speculated by many, Greek 
merchants from the Hellenic settlements in the western 
Mediterranean were excluded from trade in the Atlantic 
due to a ‘Carthaginian blockade’, cannot be elicited beyond 
doubt. Whether the Greeks would have had an interest in 
venturing outside the Straits of Gibraltar even without such 
a blockade and despite the virtual eradication of their once 
most important trading partners Tartessos, while valuable 
commodities and merchandise far in the northwest could 
also be reached via the land routes, is similarly unclear 
(though, again, Ellmers81 argues convincingly that direct 
shipping via the sea versus partial overland transport carries 
a massive difference in cost) – the contradicting evidence 
within the sources with regards to the geographical location 
of the Kassiterides, could perhaps somewhat satisfactorily be 
explained by the existence of multiple islands, or archipelagos, 
both or all known as so-called ‘tin islands’. The Battle of 
Alalia was certainly a notable event of historical significance 
and worthy of direct or indirect mention by various ancient 
writers – what it probably did not have however, was a 
meaningful or lasting impact on the existing balance of 
power and trade routes in the western Mediterranean, nor 
did it likely have any apparent far-reaching consequences 
on the mobility of the western Greeks, which was probably 
already restricted to a certain degree at the time – they 
were simply no longer represented on the island of Corsica, 
similar to about twenty-five years earlier. Nor however did 
the Phokaian-Greek withdrawal from Corsica narrow their 
enormous social, cultural and historical influence in the 
world of the western Mediterranean and beyond.
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